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THE BUSINESS PLATFORM: 
DEVELOPING AN INSTRUMENT TO GAUGE AND ASSIST 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF YOUNG FIRMS 
 
 
Abstract 
The research presented here addresses the following problems that we perceive in research on 
the development of young firms. First, we feel there is a lack of holistic, yet quantifiable and 
generalizable ways to assess the state of newly started firms. Quantitative research typically 
relies on additive models that are unable to explain more than half of the outcome variance, at 
the most. Holistic approaches tend to be qualitative and therefore have unknown 
generalizability. Second, we feel there is a lack of action-oriented assessment models that are 
firmly anchored in research. Research models typically take a passive prediction position 
rather than being action-oriented, and often build on relationships that give little hands-on 
advice to managers. Numerous practical tools for assessing and developing firms during their 
early development can be found in the ‘how to’ literature, but these are typically not anchored 
in systematic research and therefore have unknown validity. Hence, what we set out to do in 
the research presented in this article is to develop a quantifiable, holistic and action-oriented 
instrument for assessing and assisting the development of young firms. 
 
 
THE BUSINESS PLATFORM: 
DEVELOPING AN INSTRUMENT TO GAUGE AND ASSIST 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF YOUNG FIRMS 
 
Introduction 
Assessing the state of newly started firms in order to predict their fate, or to initiate 
appropriate action for increasing their probability of survival and growth, is no easy task (Hall 
1995). Such firms are in a turbulent phase of development where business activities are 
carried out in a short-term perspective and where it can be difficult to perceive more 
fundamental shortcomings that are overshadowed by everyday problems (Adizes 1988). 
Much research has been devoted to establishing associations between various kinds of 
presumed causal factors on the one hand, and the ability of a company to attain stability and 
growth on the other (e.g. Cooper 1981; van de Ven et al. 1984; Kazanjian 1988; Cooper et al. 
1994; Davidsson 1991; Jones-Evans and Klofsten 1997; Gimeno et al. 1997; Morris 1998; 
Littunen 1998; Dahlqvist et al. 2000). A general conclusion from this research is that a range 
of factors on the individual, firm and environmental levels of analysis shape the firm’s 
development. At the same time, the results suggest that there is no individual factor that 
universally and by itself has a strong determining influence. Further, explanatory models 
based on additive effects of comprehensive lists of presumed causes provide far from full 
explanations of the outcome variance. This supports the notion that holistic and to some 
extent idiosyncratic configurations of sets of factors jointly determine the success 
probabilities of young firms. 
 
Models for assessing and assisting the development of firms are a key interest for research, 
teaching, and business practice. Numerous manuals have been written that more concretely 
treat different aspects of new business development. Those provide considerable amounts of 
practical advice on how a firm can increase its chances for survival and success. In this type 
of literature, comprehensive problems in the firm are discussed, but no serious attempts are 
made to anchor the advice in systematic empirical research or to develop testable theories. 
The suggestions are based more on experience and on what—for the moment—is considered 
to be good management (Hall 1995). Although research in the last ten-year period has grown 
in scope and our knowledge and skills of early growth and development processes in firms are 
considerably greater than before, it is still fairly unusual for researchers to try to generate 
action-oriented models in this field. 
 
Our attempt to develop a quantifiable, holistic and action-oriented instrument for assessing 
and assisting the development of young firms is based on a model that builds on previous 
research and that has been used extensively in qualitative research and business consulting, 
viz. Klofsten’s Business Platform Model. In the next section we present this model and its 
underpinnings.  
 
The Business Platform Model 
It has been shown that firms that succeeded in surviving 2–3 years and that have gone through 
a number of crucial phases attain a stable foundation from which they can continue to develop 
(Mayer and Goldstein 1961; Freeman et al. 1983; Hall 1995). Gibb and Scott (1986) 
introduced the concept 'base for potential development' as an expression of this stabilizing 
condition. According to the authors, a development base has been attained when the newly 
started firm is sufficiently developed concerning resources (capacity), experiences, control, 
leadership, and idea. With this basis, the firm then has the possibility to develop and manage 
future environmental changes and can thereby be considered to have achieved stability. 
Pursuing a similar idea, Klofsten (1992) conducted a comprehensive literature review and 
defined eight firm-level cornerstones that determine a firm's early development process. 
These eight cornerstones are the business idea, the product, the market, the organisation, core 
group expertise, core group drive/motivation, customer relations and other relations. These 
cornerstones make up the Business Platform Model. The cornerstones are further explained in 
Table 1, which also displays the previous research that each cornerstone builds on or accords 
with. The purpose of the cornerstones is to describe the early development process in a 
holistic manner on the micro-level. It comprises the development process itself (idea, product, 
market, and organisation); key actors such as the founders, CEO, and board members 
(expertise and drive/motivation), and the flow of external resources (customer relations and 
other firm relations).  
 
Insert Table 1 about here! 
 
The fundamental thesis of this model is that firms are vulnerable in their early life and 
continually run the risk of disappearing from the market. Success in the firm is determined by 
how well this vulnerability is overcome, and it is the early development process that is one of 
the most important periods in the life of the firm. The thoughts and the driving forces in the 
firm and the actions being taken at this time can be decisive for the continued growth and 
development of the firm (cf. Kimberly and Miles 1980). However, the model is not a passive 
prediction model. Its purpose is to assess so as to find remedy, if need be. 
 
With no dramatic changes in the firm’s environment – changes that the firm cannot prevent, 
such as the loss of a key person or a rapid decline in market potential – success will be 
determined by how well the firm builds and maintains its business platform. A firm attains a 
platform by satisfying two criteria: securing an input of resources and developing an ability to 
manage and utilize such resources. After the platform has been achieved, a firm has a good 
deal of leeway in generating and managing its resources 
 
Early development in a firm is defined by the business platform cornerstones’ progress and 
can take as little or as much time as is needed, with some firms never actually getting beyond 
this stage. Taking steps to realise a business concept by initiating activities intended to lead to 
the creation of a firm is the beginning of early development. It ends when the firm has 
established a business platform. At the risk of being categorical, it could be argued that firms 
aspiring to grow and become significant actors in the market something must sooner or later 
attain a business platform. 
 
The reasoning, then, is that the cornerstones that make up a business platform must reach 
certain minimum levels if a business platform is to be attained (see Table 1). For example, an 
idea must be communicable both within and outside of the firm (Kazanjian 1988; Timmons 
1994). A hobby firm will not exhibit the same levels of activity and progressiveness as a firm 
with strong driving forces to grow and develop (Shaver and Scott 1991; Naffziger et al. 1994). 
It is not enough with client contacts; there must actually be customers who are continuously 
buying (Zeithaml and Bitner 1996; Prenkert 1998). Based on the resource-based view of the 
firms (Penrose 1959; Barney 1991; 1997) it can also be argued that it is often necessary to 
stand out, to have a real edge, on at least some dimension. Thus, the model is not a simple 
additive and compensatory model. Reaching high levels on several dimensions is not assumed 
to necessarily make up for severe shortcomings on another dimension, and sometimes 
achieving average levels across all cornerstones does not suffice, either. 
Based on a number of case studies, Klofsten (1992) showed that the existence or non-
existence of a business platform was possible to assess in case study research. The model was 
originally applied to technology-based firms but has also proven to be applicable to other 
types of firms (Klofsten 1998). He could also demonstrate that if a business platform it is not 
attained, the firm will sooner or later go under and disappear from the market, at least as 
independent actor. Moreover, it was possible to analyse the state of the eight cornerstones and 
determine whether a business platform has been attained. It was, accordingly, possible to 
determine the minimum level for each of the cornerstones for a business platform to be 
attained.  
 
The Business Platform Model has since been disseminated (predominantly in Europe) in 
research, education, and trade and industry (Klofsten 1992; 1994; 1997; 1998). The 
experience to date is that the platform model is a useful tool for gauging and assisting the 
development of young firms. An obvious limitation is that its validity has not yet been proven 
in broadly based research. A necessary first step towards such validation is to develop a 
standardised operationalization of firms’ standing on the ‘cornerstones’ of the platform model. 
That is what we set out to do in the present study. It is our hope that the development of such 
an instrument will facilitate also the adoption and sound application of the Business Platform 
Model by business consultants. 
 
Our aspirations for the present paper are to develop an instrument to quantify firms’ state on 
each cornerstone dimension. It should be clear from the above discussion that simple 
summation of scores from such a quantification will no suffice for determining whether a firm 
has attained a business platform or not. What is the appropriate minimum level for each 
dimension, the possible need for excellent scores on some dimensions, and how this varies by 
industry or type of firm are questions that will need further research.  
 
The sample 
The data that are presented in this study derive from technology- and knowledge-based firms 
located at Swedish technopoles2  (Heydebreck et al. 2000). Addresses to the firms were 
obtained from organisations at each technopol that work with different forms of business 
support, for example science parks and innovation centres at universities. As the aim of the 
paper was to study growth and development in young firms, firms more than 10 years old 
were excluded. At the same time, it was considered an advantage if the firms had some 
history and a lower age limit of two years was set. That left 313 firms, all of which were sent 
a questionnaire (addressed to the CEO or other decision-making executive) either in 
electronic form (260 firms) or with traditional mail (53 firms). After a phone reminder per 
telephone, a total of 114 firms returned the questionnaire, which meant a response frequency 
of 36%.  
 
While these response rates are a disappointment compared to what have been obtained in 
some Swedish studies (cf. Davidsson 1989; Wiklund 1998) they are high compared to most 
published mail survey research internationally. Importantly, we are in the present context not 
trying to obtain population estimates (e.g. norm values) for a well-defined population. What 
we need is a ‘large enough’ sample from a relevant population, i.e., one whose members are 
likely subjects for real application of the Business Platform Model, in order to assess the 
technical properties of the instrument we are trying to develop. Therefore, the levels of non-
                                                          
2 Technopoles are regions which exhibit strong technology- and knowledge-based new business development. 
They are a fertile combination of a university with a technical profile, a research institute, and science parks as 
well as a number of large and small firms. In Sweden, Göteborg, Linköping, Lund, Stockholm, and Uppsala are 
the main regions classified as technopolises. 
response are not severe for our purposes. Internal non-response to individual parts or items is 
a worse problem, because it may indicate some type of inadequacy of the instrument. This is 
an issue we will have reason to return to.  
 
The average and median ages of the firms were 6.7 and 7.0 years, respectively. During 1998, 
the average turnover was SEK 9.6 million (USD 1.1 million) and the median SEK 9.0 million 
(USD 1 million) with a range of SEK 0–71 million (USD 0–7.9 million). An average of 4.6 
persons (median 3.0) were employed in the firms (range 0–100). A majority of 66 firms 
(58%) were oriented towards providing services while 40 (35%) primarily produced products. 
Six firms (5%) reported other forms of business but did not specify what. Slightly more than a 
quarter of the firms, 30 (26%), reported at this time that they had changed the focus of their 
business since start-up. Most of the firms (55, 48%) stated that they have a background from 
some university, for example that the founders had been researchers or students immediately 
prior to start-up. Those who reported otherwise (34 firms, 30%) came from firms or research 
institutes. 
 
The instrument 
A team of four people developed the operationalizations. This team was lead by the two 
authors, Magnus Klofsten, who developed the Business Platform Model (Klofsten 1992; 
1994; 1997; 1998) and has substantial consulting experience from its use. Per Davidsson, who 
has considerable expertise in survey research and development of measuring instruments (cf. 
Bellu et al. 1990; Brown et al. forthcoming; Davidsson 1989a; 1989b; 1989c; 1991; 1995a; 
1995b; Davidsson and Wiklund 1997; Wiklund et al. 1997). 
 
In developing the instrument we adopted the standard procedure of generating multiple item 
batteries of questions for each intended dimension. Following the recommendations of 
Converse and Presser (1986) we choose a forced choice format. The respondents were asked 
to indicate their relative degree of agreement on a five-point scale between two opposing 
statements. In order to arrive at a manageable instrument we aimed at generating about five 
items for each dimension. After discussion of each suggested item from substantial as well as 
technical standpoints we arrived at the version sent out, which includes a total of 36 items, 
three to six for each dimension.  
All items in the sent out version are listed in Table 1. Importantly, for each item the 
respondent was asked to give separate responses for the firm’s current situation and for its 
status two years earlier. In that way we can make two—albeit not two independent—
evaluations of the technical properties of the instrument. 
 
The package of questions aimed at capturing the various dimensions of the business platform 
constitutes the lion’s share of the mail/e-mail questionnaire. The remainder of the 
questionnaire concerned background facts about the firm and its founders as well as a 
question concerning the relative ease or difficulty of answering the business platform items.  
  
Analysis method 
If our operationalization is successful the items aimed at assessing the same cornerstone 
dimension (i.e., Idea, Product, Market, Organisation, and so forth) should have high inter-
correlation’s. This allows summing the items to an index, thereby reducing the influence of 
random measurement error. In order to assess our measures’ suitability for index construction 
we ran SPSS reliability analysis routine in order to obtain Cronbach Alpha values. In the 
interpretation of this analysis we apply Nunnally’s rule of thumb that a Chronbach Alpha 
above 0.70 indicates satisfactory measurement quality from a technical standpoint (Nunnally 
1967; Nunnally and Bernstein 1994).  
 
In order to be useful the resulting measures should not only be reliable but also distinct from 
one another. There should be proof that packages of items intended to measure different 
dimensions really do so. That is, the resulting indices should have discriminant validity. In 
order to assess whether the dimensions proposed by the Business Platform Model are 
empirically distinct we ran SPSS factor analysis with principal component extraction and 
varimax (orthogonal) rotation. The logic behind this is that if items ‘within’ a dimension have 
higher inter-correlations than their cross-correlations with items of other dimensions, then the 
different item packages should have a tendency to form separate factors in factor analysis. 
However, we did not assume a priori that the different dimensions (or ‘cornerstones’) of the 
Business Platform Model would be uncorrelated (orthogonal). For one thing, they should all 
to some extent be a function of time. Therefore, a crystal clear factor pattern was not expected. 
This is one reason why we also evaluated the question of discriminant validity via correlation 
analysis. Another reason for this is that summated indices are not identical to factors in a 
factor analysis, and the summated indices are what we eventually propose be used.  
 
Needless to say, the operationalization should not only be technically adequate. It should also 
reflect the empirical reality the conceptualization aims to capture. One aspect of this is that 
the items should have face validity. Since the creator of the Business Platform Model is on the 
research team this was relatively easy to achieve.  
 
Results 
Table 2 displays all items (translated from the Swedish original) that were tried and also 
specifies which were excluded. The latter appear within parenthesis. It further displays 
Cronbach Alpha values and other statistics for the resulting indices, both as concerns the 
current situation and the firm’s status two years earlier. We will now comment the results for 
each cornerstone. 
 
As regards Business Idea three out of the four original items could be retained. The resulting 
three item scale has high to very high reliability according to the Cronbach Alpha criterion. 
The assessment of the business idea thus appears to be successful. This is also indicated by 
the very low internal non-response (one and seven cases, respectively). However, some 
further improvement of the measurement of this dimension would be valuable. The 
distribution is positively skewed with an across item average score of 4.25 out of five, and a 
full 26 percent of the sample has the maximal score (15) on the ‘Now’ version of the scale. 
This suggests that some minor rephrasing of the current items and the additions of one or two 
new items would help capturing the full range of variation better than the current version does. 
For a first try, however, the current version performs very well. 
 
Only three items were developed for the second scale, Product, and all three could be retained. 
The Cronbach Alpha values here are extremely high for both versions of the scale, indicating 
very high reliability. The measurement of this cornerstone is not entirely unproblematic, 
though. Firstly, internal non-response is non-negligible. For some reason some respondents 
appear to think that the questions are not suitable to describe their firm. Secondly, the 
distributions of responses are bi-modal, with over-representation at both extremes. This 
suggests that the respondents tend to view this dimension as dichotomous: either you have a 
developed product ready for sale, or you do not. Again, then, some further improvement 
seems possible although this first attempt must be judged as relatively successful. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here! 
 
For the third cornerstone, Market, satisfactory to high Cronbach Alpha values were obtained 
after deletion of one of the original items. High reliability is thus attributed to the resulting 
four-item scale. The distributions also look good despite some positive skewness. The 
problem here is instead the high internal non-response. About twenty percent of the sample 
chose to skip one or several items. We have checked that neither for Market nor for Product is 
there any clear difference between manufacturing and service firms’ relative propensity to 
give valid responses. The reasons for the internal non-response require further 
investigation. For those who have answered the scale performs well.  
 
The next cornerstone, Organisation, is the one for which measurement has been most 
successful. The Cronbach Alpha values are high, the distribution is very close to normal, and 
internal non-response is modest. From a reliability point of view, this dimension works almost 
perfectly as it is, and needs no further development. After elimination of one item the five-
item Competence scale also has very satisfactory properties, with low internal non-response, 
high Cronbach’s Alpha values and only a mild positive skewness. Similarly, the results for 
Drive/Motivation are also satisfactory, although the Alpha values are only slightly above 0.70 
and the positive skewness somewhat more pronounced.  
 
The results for the final two dimensions, Customer Relations and Other Relations, are very 
similar. Both are based on four items in the final analysis and both are somewhat positively 
skewed with across-item averages of 3.79 and 3.81 (out of five), respectively. Neither has any 
sever problems with internal non-response, but for both the ‘Now’ version of the scale comes 
out with a less than satisfactory Alpha. Adding one more appropriate item each to the 
assessment of these two cornerstones is recommendable. 
 
Taken together, this initial attempt to create a formal operationalization of the Business 
Platform Model must be judged as very successful from a reliability point of view. The 
instrument seems to work reasonably well ‘as is’ although improvement would be desirable 
for some of the cornerstones. Encouraging for the instrument’s validity is also that the means 
are uniformly higher, and the standard deviations uniformly lower, for the ‘Now’ version of 
the scales relative to the ‘two years ago’ versions. This is the development that should be 
expected over time from a surviving sample of young firms. The only more serious problem 
detected so far is, arguably, the rather substantial internal non-response for the Market and 
Product dimensions. A closer look at this problem may suggest limitations as to for what 
types of firm these dimensions of the model are applicable. Alternatively, it may suggest a 
more positive solution to the problem. It is conceivable that with face-to-face or telephone 
interviewing the uncertainty behind the internal non-response could be sorted out. As to mail 
surveys, improved instructions to the respondent might help. 
 
The results for the control question that were asked after the platform items do not suggest 
that many respondents found the questions difficult to answer. As regards the situation ‘Now’, 
two thirds of the sample agreed completely or partly that it was easy to determine what the 
answers should be. For natural reasons relatively fewer respondents—49 percent—found it 
easy to give responses for the firm’s situation two years earlier. The proportions that refuted 
that the questions were easy stayed at eight and twelve percent, respectively.  
 Having established face validity and reliability we now turn to the issue of discriminant 
validity. For this purpose we ran an exploratory factor analysis with the default criterion that 
eigenvalues for extracted factors should be higher than unity. We used, the ‘Now’ version of 
each item and included only those 32 items that were retained after the reliability analysis 
reported above. This initial analysis yielded ten factors. These ten factors accounted for 70 
percent of the total variation. However, a couple of factors had only one high loading. In 
order to better assess the fit between the eight cornerstone conceptualization and the factor 
analysis results we performed a second run with the extraction of eight factors as a forced 
choice. These eight factors account for 65 percent of the variance. It is the varimax rotated 
version of this analysis that is displayed in Table 3. Note that due to listwise deletion of cases 
with missing data this analysis is based on 72 cases only. Note also that for ease of 
interpretation the factors have been re-numbered and loadings below |0.30| have been 
suppressed.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here! 
 
The result of this analysis is remarkably clear. All items intended to measure the same 
dimension load on the same factor, and only in two cases out of 32 does an item have a higher 
loading on another factor than ‘its own’. The number of ‘side-loadings’ above .30 is very low 
over-all. This clearly suggests that the different item packages measure different dimensions. 
That is, discriminant validity appears to be high. 
 
When the analysis is re-run for the ‘two years ago’ versions of the items the results are similar. 
In some ways they are ‘better’, in other ways ‘worse’ than those displayed in Table 3. The 
analysis yields eight factors, by the default criterion, and these eight factors account for 73 
percent of the variance. The factor pattern is similar to that displayed in Table 3 and thus very 
clear for most dimensions. However, the Competence and Customer Relations dimensions are 
blurred with a tendency for the items for both of those to split between two mixed 
competence/customer relations factors. 
 
The factors in the factor analysis can be regarded as weighed indices of all items included in 
the analysis, but with greater weight given to items with high loadings. Summated indices are 
based solely on those items that were intended to assess that particular dimension, and these 
items are given equal weight in the summation. Therefore, a summated index is not identical 
to its corresponding factor. While the factors are constructed to be uncorrelated, the indices 
may overlap. We therefore supplement the factor analysis with a correlation analysis to give 
more direct evidence on the relative distinctiveness of the cornerstone indices. This analysis is 
displayed in Table 4.  
 
The results show that the correlations are positive for the most part, as could (and should) be 
expected. Only one correlation is (non-significantly) negative. Interestingly, two of the 
dimensions one might have suspected were related—Market and Customer Relations—are not 
correlated at all in this sample. Most correlations are modest. The fact that the Organization 
dimension has a couple of correlations in the .40s does not prove it not to be distinct enough. 
A correlation on 0.44 reflects that the two factors have less than 20 percent of the variance in 
common. This is very far from being identical, and our conclusion that discriminant validity is 
satisfactory remains valid.  
 
Discussion 
In all, we would hold that our attempt to create a formal operationalization of the Business 
Platform Model has been successful. We have, arguably, established high face validity, 
moderate to very high reliability, and high discriminant validity for the different cornerstone 
indices. This is an important step towards making the Business Platform Model a quantifiable, 
holistic and action-oriented instrument for assessing and assisting the development of young 
firms, and hence towards increased and more well-founded use of the model.  
 
Much remains to be done before a fully satisfactory tool has been developed. As noted above, 
some revision of the instrument may be needed in order to improve its technical properties. 
These technical properties need to be tested also for translated version, so that the 
applicability of the instrument can be generalized to other countries. Further research on large 
samples should use the improved version of the instrument to assess the state of firms at 
various points in time during their early development and relate these assessments to 
outcomes. This is needed in order to establish predictive validity of the Business Platform 
Model as operationalised with our instrument. This involves also the issues of establishing 
minimum levels for each cornerstone and investigating the possible need of outstanding levels 
on some dimensions, as well as checking for differences in these regards by industry or type 
of firm.  
 
The fact that the model is based on an extensive literature review and qualitative research 
should ascertain some external validity. However, further in-depth work is needed in order to 
determine whether assessments based on the standardized instrument accord with clinical 
judgment. Experiments would be the ideal for evaluating the model’s and the instrument’s 
suitability not only for prediction but also as a basis for corrective action. Such experiments 
would be difficult to set up in practice and if possible conducting them would be ethically 
questionable, as it would involve refraining from giving advice the model predicts is essential 
for the firm’s survival. However, quasi-experiments should be possible. That is, all cases in 
the study would get proper advice according to the model. The experimental ‘manipulation’ 
would be provided by the firm’ themselves, i.e., the extent to which they choose to implement 
the actions suggested by the advice. Evidence that those who followed the advice fared better 
than those that did not would be very strong support for the validity of the model and its 
operationalizations. Ultimately, that is the type of evidence we need in order to apply this tool 
with great confidence. 
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Table 1. Cornerstones of the Business Platform 
 
Cornerstone Previous research Minimum levels to attaim 
Formulation and clarification  
of the business idea 
Kazanjian (1988) 
Bjerke (1989) 
Hills (1994) 
Timmons (1994) 
Cooper et al (1995) 
Kohen and Kohli (1998) 
The idea must be clarified so that 
the special know-how that makes up 
the commercial springboard is 
understandable and can be 
communicated internally and 
externally 
Development to finished  
product 
Adizes (1988) 
Kazanjian (1988) 
Roberts (1991) 
Rothwell (1992) 
Autio (1997) 
Dyer and Gupta (1999) 
Once the product is available, it 
must gain acceptance by one or 
more reference customers - the firm 
has then proven that it is capable of 
satisfying the markets’ needs and 
wants 
Definition of market Miller and Friesen (1984) 
Hisrich (1992) 
Westhead and Birley (1993) 
Hall and Adams (1994) 
Weinstein (1994) 
O’Gorman (1997) 
The firm must define a market that 
is large enough and profitable  
enough to ensure survival 
Development of an  
operational organization 
Mintzberg (1973) 
Greiner (1972) 
Kazanjian (1988) 
Kazanjian and Drazin (1990) 
Chandler and Hanks (1994) 
Barney (1997) 
Shepherd and Shanley (1998) 
The running of business operations 
requires the existence of an 
organizational structure that 
facilitates functional co-ordination - 
this structure should take advantage 
of the firm's inherent flexibility and 
innovative ability, and be fairly 
effective at internal co-ordination 
and at maintaining and developing 
external relations 
Core group expertise Susbauer (1967) 
Cooper and Bruno (1977) 
Brockhaus (1980) 
Chandler and Hanks (1994) 
Bird (1995) 
Walsh and Kirchhoff (1998) 
A business firm must have  
technological and commercial  
competence to develop its  
products and market – it is  
crucial to have access to  
expertise for solving the firm's  
real problems 
Commitment of the core group 
and the prime motivation of  
each actor 
McClelland (1961) 
Smith (1967) 
Birley and Norburn (1985) 
Gartner (1985) 
Shaver and Scott (1991) 
Naffziger et al (1994) 
A basic requirement for 
development is that at least one 
person is highly motivated and that 
the other key actors are committed 
to the business idea 
 
Customer relations Roberts and Wainer (1968) 
Utterback and Reitberger (1982) 
Aijo (1996) 
Zeithaml and Bitner (1996) 
Prenkert (1998) 
Krieger (1998) 
A customer base must be 
qualitatively and quantitatively 
strong enough to generate operating 
revenue. 
Other firm relations Bollinger et al (1981)  
Knight (1986) 
Bruno and Tyebjee (1984) 
Olofsson and Wahlbin (1984) 
Autio (1995) 
Heydebreck (1997) 
The firm may sometimes need 
additional capital, management 
know-how, or other ‘oil’ in its 
machinery - these relations 
complement the customer 
relationships 
 
Table 2 Scale construction results for each cornerstone in the Business Platform Model 
 
Cornerstone Business Idea 
Items Low (1)  High (5) 
 The idea about what the firm’s 
operations should be is not 
particularly specified. 
vs. There exists a very clearly specified 
idea for what the firm’s operations 
should be.  
 Within the firm there is some 
lack of clarity as to what ideas 
should be pursued. 
vs. Everybody in the firm is completely 
clear about what ideas to prioritize 
 It is relatively unclear what type 
of need of what type of customer 
the firm’s idea might satisfy. 
vs. It is completely clear what need for 
what type of customer the firm’s idea 
can satisfy. 
 (It is rather difficult to say what 
is special or unique about the 
firm’s idea.) 
vs. (It is completely identified what is 
special and unique about the firm’s 
idea.) 
 No. of items No. of cases Mean s.d. Cronbach’s alpha
Scale ‘Now’ 3 113 12.68 2.12 0.79 
Scale ‘2 years ago’ 3 107 10.77 3.41 0.90 
 Product 
Items Low (1)  High (5) 
 There is no developed product. vs. There is at least one well developed 
product that is entirely ready for sale.
 No user has tested the product. vs. The product has been tested by a 
number of potential users. 
 No reference customer can verify 
the usefulness of the product. 
vs. A number of reference customers 
exist, who can verify the usefulness 
of the product. 
 No. of items No. of cases Mean s.d. Cronbach’s alpha
Scale ‘Now’ 3 101 12.29 3.85 0.94 
Scale ‘2 years ago’ 3 95 10.07 4.83 0.96 
 Market 
Items Low (1)  High (5) 
 The firm has no limitations as to 
what customers it turns to. 
vs. The firm turns itself to a very specific 
customer category. 
 It is not possible to say what 
characterizes the firm’s 
customers. 
vs. There exist a number of criteria 
which precisely define the potential 
customers that have the highest 
probability to buy. 
 (What value the firm’s product 
can offer the customers is built 
on assumptions within the firm.)
vs. (Customer value for the firm’s 
product is completely specified based 
on contacts with customers) 
 The market is worked up mainly 
through random contacts. 
vs. The firm follows a structured strategy 
for working up the market. 
 The firm sees a large number of 
customer categories all of which 
are deemed equally important to 
cultivate. 
vs. The firm gives clear priority to 
certain customer categories over 
others. 
 No. of items No. of cases Mean s.d. Cronbach’s alpha
Scale ‘Now’ 4 91 15.96 2.80 0.70 
Scale ‘2 years ago’ 4 88 12.81 3.97 0.84 
 
Table 2 (cont.) Scale construction results for each cornerstone in the Business Platform 
Model 
 
Cornerstone Organization 
Items Low (1)  High (5) 
 All staff do most types of work. vs. All staff have clearly delimited tasks.
 There are no specified 
organizational units. 
vs. It is possible to clearly describe the 
firm in an organizational chart. 
 Members of the organization are 
recruited on the basis of the 
founders’ personal network. 
vs. Members of the organizations are 
there because of conscious 
recruitment of specific competencies. 
 The firms operations are adapted 
to the situation and governed by 
events that come up. 
vs. A disciplined and goal oriented effort 
towards developing the firm is being 
implemented. 
 Everybody in the firm have 
responsibility and authority 
within most areas. 
vs. There is a strict division of authority 
and responsibilities within the firm.  
 No. of items No. of cases Mean s.d. Cronbach’s alpha
Scale ‘Now’ 5 108 16.63 5.28 0.83 
Scale ‘2 years ago’ 5 104 13.35 5.22 0.84 
 Competence 
Items Low (1)  High (5) 
 To some extent the firm lacks 
knowledge about the market for 
its products. 
vs. The firm is very well equipped with 
knowledge about the market for its 
products. 
 To some extent the firm lacks 
competence in marketing and 
selling. 
 The firm is very well equipped with 
competence in marketing and selling.
 To some extent the firm lacks 
expert knowledge within its 
domain. 
 The firm is very well equipped with 
expert knowledge within its domain. 
 To some extent the firm lacks 
experience and competence in 
the area of leadership. 
vs. The firm is very well equipped with 
experience and competence in the 
area of leadership. 
 The competence the firm has will 
not cover its needs for the future.
vs. The competence the firm has will 
completely cover its needs for the 
future. 
 Every member of the 
organization is responsible for 
the enhancement of his/her own 
competence. 
vs. A systematic plan for enhancement of 
competence is implemented for every 
member of the organization.  
 No. of items No. of cases Mean s.d. Cronbach’s alpha
Scale ‘Now’ 6 111 18.56 4.31 0.77 
Scale ‘2 years ago’ 6 105 17.69 5.04 0.81 
 
Table 2 (cont.) Scale construction results for each cornerstone in the Business Platform 
Model 
 
Cornerstone Drive/Motivation 
Items Low (1)  High (5) 
 The founder’s primary goal with 
the firm is to provide employment 
for him/herself and perhaps some 
friends. 
vs. The founder’s primary goal with the 
firm is to ‘amaze the world’; build a 
growth company. 
 The founder regards the firm as 
one of several possible ways of 
earning his/her living. 
vs. The founder is completely geared 
towards a future as business owner-
manager. 
 Work must not intrude on the 
leisure of the people involved. 
vs. All time is invested in the firm. 
 For all parties concerned their 
involvement with the firm can be 
characterized as modest. 
vs. All parties concerned have a very large 
involvement with the firm.  
 No. of items No. of cases Mean s.d. Cronbach’s alpha
Scale ‘Now’ 4 109 15.29 3.38 0.71 
Scale ‘2 years ago’ 4 105 13.52 3.68 0.72 
 Customer relations 
Items Low (1)  High (5) 
 The firm has as yet not sold any 
product to a customer. 
vs. The firm has a large number of 
customers who have bought its 
products. 
 It is not likely that any customer 
will repeat purchase the product. 
vs. It is very common that the firm’s 
customer make repeat purchases. 
 It is difficult to create sales to new 
customers. 
vs. The firm constantly gets loads of new 
customers. 
 The customers are sometimes 
dissatisfied. 
vs. The customers are always very 
satisfied. 
 (One person is keeps all customer 
contacts.) 
vs. (Customer contacts are dispersed 
among all members of the 
organization). 
 No. of items No. of cases Mean s.d. Cronbach’s alpha
Scale ‘Now’ 4 107 15.15 2.77 0.60 
Scale ‘2 years ago’ 4 104 13.30 3.65 0.73 
 Other relations 
Items Low (1)  High (5) 
 There exist no relationships with 
banks or investors. 
vs. There exist very good and stable 
relationships with banks and investors. 
 The firm has a shortage of 
financial capital. 
vs. Access to financial capital for the firms 
operations is no problem whatsoever. 
 There exist no contacts that can 
provide credibility for the firm in 
the eyes of the market. 
vs. The firm has well developed contacts 
with other actors who give the firm the 
complementary resource ‘credibility’. 
 There exist no contacts that can 
provide the firm with additional 
management competence. 
vs. The firm has well developed contacts 
with other actors which provides the 
firm the with additional management 
competence. 
 No. of items No. of cases Mean s.d. Cronbach’s alpha
Scale ‘Now’ 4 112 15.23 3.10 0.63 
Scale ‘2 years ago’ 4 106 12.91 4.01 0.80 
 
 
Table 3 Factor (principal components) analysis loadings for cornerstone items (n=72) 
 
Factor 
Items 
F1: 
Idea 
F2: 
Product 
F3: 
Market 
F4: 
Organi-
zation. 
F5: 
Compe-
tence 
F6: 
Drive/ 
Motivation
F7: 
Customer 
Relations 
F8: 
Other 
Relations
Idea 1 .75   .36     
Idea 2 .84        
Idea 3 .75        
Product 1  .80  .38     
Product 2  .83       
Product 3  .90       
Market 1   .70      
Market 2   .80      
Market 4   .43 .64     
Market 5   .76      
Org. 1    .77     
Org. 2    .81     
Org. 3    .69     
Org. 4    .65     
Org. 5    .77     
Comp. 1     .75    
Comp. 2     .77    
Comp. 3     .56    
Comp. 4     .78    
Comp. 5     .63  .31  
Drive 1      .75   
Drive 2      .68   
Drive 3      .68   
Drive 4     .67 .39   
Cust. 1       .75  
Cust. 2       .69  
Cust. 3       .56 .37 
Cust. 4       .65  
Other 1        .54 
Other 2        .51 
Other 3        .73 
Other 4      .35  .85 
 
Table 4 Pearson product-moment correlation between the cornerstone summated indices 
 
 Idea  Product Market Organi-
zation 
Compe-
tence 
Drive/ 
Motivation
Customer 
Relations 
Other 
Relations
Idea 1.00        
Product -.07 1.00       
Market .05 .36** 1.00      
Org. .13 .44** .44** 1.00     
Comp. .13 .22* .13 .31** 1.00    
Drive .19* .07 .15 .23* .42** 1.00   
Cust. .04 .22* .00 .17 .29** .19 1.00  
Other .11 .13 .16 .07 .19* .10 .25** 1.00 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
 
 
